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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A R Y  
This legal opinion concerns the question whether and how the recent Opinion 1/15 of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the Draft EU/Canada PNR Agreement 
impacts the Proposal for a Regulation on an Entry/Exit System. For that purpose, it analyses 
in detail the main findings in Opinion 1/15 and related earlier case law on data retention 
schemes before applying the identified principles to the context of data collection and 
retention in the planned EES.  
1. With its decision in Opinion 1/15 the Court further confirmed that the standards developed so 
far for data retention schemes are to be applied irrespective of the nature of the instrument 
when testing the admissibility of a measure in view of the right to privacy and data protection 
as they result from Articles 7 and 8 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
respectively. Therefore, the standards can be regarded as general principles for such 
schemes, whether they are based on secondary EU law such as Directives or Regulations as 
well as in the context of International Agreements or instruments with an external effect.  
2.  The general principles developed by the CJEU for data retention schemes need to be 
respected whenever data collected and retained reveal private information. The standards 
are not dependent on the sector, but any relevant data retention measure is regarded to be 
infringing the above mentioned fundamental rights and the type of data as well as the means 
of collection are only of relevance for the question of justification. The fact that data collection 
and retention under the EES takes place in a different context than processing under the 
PNR Agreement, which itself had a different context than the communications data setting 
dealt with in the previous Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2/Watson judgments, does not 
influence the necessity to respect the same general principles.  
3.  In developing the general principles, the CJEU integrated findings of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) in mass surveillance and data retention cases when the Strasbourg 
Court interpreted Article 8 ECHR. Together, the case law of the two Courts underlines that 
data retention schemes have in principle a significant impact on the right to privacy and data 
protection of all data subjects concerned and therefore, such measures can only be justified 
if they genuinely meet an objective of general interest and comply with a strict necessity-
requirement. Whereas the CJEU has confirmed that fighting serious crime such as terrorism 
is an objective that can justify the collection and retention of certain data of specific persons 
for longer periods, this is much less obvious for other objectives. The EES pursues a primary 
objective of migration management and border control. The prevention, detection and 
investigation of serious crime is merely a secondary objective of the planned system. Thus, 
retention of data under the EES is not limited to persons who represent a risk to public 
security. Therefore, the retention periods as regards the primary purpose of the EES are not 
proportionate to the objective pursued and not strictly necessary in order to achieve it. 
4.  Based on the findings in Opinion 1/15 it is clear that even justified retention of data needs to 
be limited in terms of duration to what is necessary in connection with the pursued objective. 
This led the Court to find that although the transfer by air carriers and subsequent use of air 
passengers data by Canadian authorities was acceptable, the continued retention after 
departure of the concerned individuals from Canada was no longer needed as long as they 
did not represent a risk to public security and therefore, in violation of EU law. The same 
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logic applies for the data retention periods under the EES. Where a person lawfully enters 
the Schengen area and exits the EU within the period of authorized stay, data may only be 
retained if an objective beyond facilitation of border control and management is applicable, 
such as objective evidence that the data may contribute to the protection of public security.  
 Longer retention periods concerning Third Country Nationals (TCNs) whose entry was 
refused or who overstayed the period of authorized stay, are possible but should be decided 
on a case by case basis by the competent authority verifying the conditions for entry. Thus, if 
the refusal of entry is based on a criminal offence, the retention of the respective data would 
be necessary in order to pursue a legitimate interest of public security in preventing the 
person from entering the EU. The same logic should be applied for individuals who exceeded 
the period of their authorized stay in the Schengen area. Whenever there is objective 
evidence that the data of a person may contribute to the prevention, detection and 
investigation of serious criminal offences, the prolongation of retention periods for persons 
falling under any of the above-mentioned categories beyond that of personal data from 
unsuspected persons is justified. However, it would need to be established whether that data 
should be stored in a system established primary for border management purposes or rather 
in a specific databases for LE purposes.  
5. Concerning access to retained data by LEAs, the CJEU previously decided in the data 
retention cases mentioned as well as the Schrems judgment and confirmed now in Opinion 
1/15 that personal data must be effectively protected against the risk of abuse and unlawful 
access and use. Lawful access to personal data by competent authorities must therefore be 
based on objective evidence and preceded by prior review carried out by a court or by an 
independent authority. In cases of urgency, where early access is regarded as imperative, 
when the Proposal for the Regulation foresees that prior authorisation can be disregarded 
and the central access point shall process an access request immediately, the ex post-
review on the legitimacy of the request is all the more important to ensure safeguards against 
potential fundamental rights violations. This ex post-review has to be carried out by a court or 
independent authority. A lack of such provisions makes the EES incompatible with the 
standards required by the CJEU. 
6.  It is important that strict necessity as condition for retention periods as well as the 
requirements for LE access laid down by the CJEU are applied also for the EES. The 
proposed EES Regulation does not fulfil these requirements at least with regard to the 
proportionality of retention periods that must be based on strict necessity, conditions for 
judicial review prior to LE access to personal data and the lack of a truly independent ex post 
review mechanism. Beyond the EES, the requirements mentioned by the CJEU should be 
seen as a basis to set a standard for any future database retaining data of individuals for 
long periods. Especially with regard to interoperable databases, concerns regarding the 
different purposes of databases, the conditions for LE access and varying retention periods 
arise. Therefore, a standard model should be established along the conditions established by 
the CJEU in order to prevent fundamental rights violations, particularly, by means of 
automated processing of personal data and profiling of the individuals concerned. When 
applying the standards, further requirements need to be taken into consideration with data 
transfer to third countries that will take place within the scope of Regulation 2016/679 and 
Directive 2016/680 respectively, even if data is originally stored within the territory of the 
European Union.  
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A.  Background and Scope of Analysis  
I.  Background to the Legal Opinion 
In the past decade there have been numerous measures introduced which – often 
responding to terrorist attacks – foresee the collection and retention of different types of data. 
Often these are regarded as being useful for law enforcement purposes in order to prevent or 
combat serious crimes such as terrorism even if the primary objective of the measures may 
have been different. It can be noted that the pressure to guarantee public security often leads 
to the proposal of using ever-growing technological abilities in surveillance and monitoring 
efforts. The legislative bodies of the European Union have contributed with their share of 
instruments introducing such measures and adding to activities of the Member States. 
Notably, both for purposes within the European Union, but also in its external relations, 
instruments were proposed and introduced that allow the following of communications or 
travel activities by EU citizens as well as Third Country Nationals.  
The increasing number of such proposals or legislative acts is in stark contrast to the legal 
evaluation of these instruments by courts, most notably the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU): just as frequently as measures are adopted and introduced it seems that the 
analysis of them results in finding a fundamental rights violation due to an unjustified 
intrusion of privacy or infringement of data protection rights. The more general, all-
encompassing and wide-ranging the collection and retention of data, the less targeted and 
limited, the more likely it is that the measure will be struck down.1 
The present legal opinion is prepared in light of this development on the one hand and a very 
recent development in which context data retention and its limitations by fundamental rights 
will play an important role again. Since a few years border control has become a crucial 
element in the debate of internal security concerns within the European Union. Additionally, 
very recent terrorist attacks have given rise to increased security and surveillance measures, 
including data retention and analysis as means for crime investigation in the context of 
migration monitoring. 
                                                
1  See generally on this development Mark D. Cole and Teresa Quintel, ““Is there anybody out there?” – 
Retention of Communications Data. Analysis of the status quo in light of the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in: Weaver et al. 
(ed.), Privacy in an Internet Age, CAP 2018 (forthcoming); Mark D. Cole and Annelies Vandendriessche, 
“Case Note:From Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems in Luxembourg to Zakharov and Szabó/Vissy in 
Strasbourg: What the ECtHR Made of the Deep Pass by the CJEU in the Recent Cases on Mass 
Surveillance Roman Zakharov v Russia (App no 47143/06) and Szabó andVissy v Hungary (App no. 
37138/14)”, (2016) 2(1) European Data Protection Law Review (EDPL), p. 121-129. On the groundbreaking 
judgment of the CJEU declaring the Data Retention Directive void cf. Franziska Boehm and Mark D. Cole, 
'Data Retention after the Judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union', study for the 
Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament. Münster/Luxembourg, 30 June 2014, especially concerning 
measures such as PNR and border control p. 73 et seq., 89 et seq., 101 et seq., available at 
http://www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/Boehm-Cole-data_retention-study-print-layout.pdf. 
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Due to the absence of internal borders in the EU between Member States that are part of the 
Schengen area, new information tools were set up at the EU’s external borders to strengthen 
border management and security cooperation between Member States’ Law Enforcement 
Authorities (LEAs)2, being assisted by EU actors such as Europol. In the past months, the 
Commission proposed several changes to expand existing databases, widen access to 
relevant data for LEAs and to examine the possibility of a legal framework to enable the 
sharing of information among different IT systems.3 Furthermore, several proposals for the 
establishment of additional databases have been put forward by the Commission.4 One of 
the proposed databases which is now up for decision in the legislative procedure is the 
Entry/Exit System (EES). It builds on the “Smart Borders Package”5 presented in 2013, which 
at the time did not secure consensus among the co-legislators. It was since subject to 
additional technical and operational studies completed in 20156 which were preparatory 
steps for the new proposal of an EES that was put forward in April 2016.7 This seeks to 
establish a system that stores alphanumeric and biometric data (a combination of four 
fingerprints and the facial image), that would allow to record information on the time and 
place of entry and exit of Third Country Nationals (TCNs) when travelling into the Schengen 
area, and to grant LEAs access to retained data for the prevention, detection and 
investigation of terrorism and other serious criminal offences. 
There have been many concerns expressed already in the early negotiation phase preparing 
the establishment of an EES. Apart from political considerations about the usefulness of such 
a system, the main concern that has been addressed by several actors, is the question of the 
system’s compatibility with fundamental rights, in particular the right to privacy and data 
protection as they are laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU as well as in Article 16 TFEU in addition to the provision of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR)’s Article 8 ECHR. Various actors, such as the Article 29 Working 
Party8, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)9 and scholars10, as well as the 
                                                
2  In the following the abbreviation “LEAs” will be used for both terms, Law Enforcement Authorities as well as 
Law Enforcement Agencies, the abbreviation “LE” for Law Enforcement respectively. 
3  Cf. for details European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council: Stronger Smarter Information Systems for Border and Security”, COM(2016) 205 final, 
Brussels, 6 April 2016. 
4  See for instance, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) and amending Regulations (EU) No 
515/2014, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2016/794 and (EU) 2016/1624, COM(2016) 731 final, Brussels, Brussels, 16 
November 2016. 
5  European Commission, ‘Smart Borders’: for an Open and Secure Europe, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-141_en.htm. 
6  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)586614.  
7  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Entry/Exit System 
(EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third country nationals crossing the external 
borders of the Member States of the European Union and determining the conditions for access to the EES 
for law enforcement purposes and amending Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 and Regulation (EU) No 
1077/2011.  
8  The Article 29 Working Party commented on the Communication from the Commission on Smart Borders in 
a letter addressed to Commissioner Malmström of 12 June 2012. 
9  EDPS Opinion 06/2016 on the Second EU Smart Borders Package. Recommendations on the revised 
Proposal to establish an Entry/Exit System, 21 September 2016. 
10  Cf. Julien Jeandesboz, Susie Alegre, and Niovi Vavoula, "European Travel Information and Authorisation 
System (ETIAS): Border Management, Fundamental Rights and Data Protection", January 2017; FRA-2017 
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institutions’ legal services elaborated intensively what is problematic about mass retention of 
personal data, and, linked to that, the establishment of large scale databases. These 
contributions already shed light on why some of the issues dealt with in this legal opinion are 
problematic from the outset. The present opinion will focus on whether the planned EES 
meets the strict necessity and proportionality test in the specific way it was developed by the 
CJEU for mass data retention instruments to be justifiable.  
It is worth mentioning that the EES if realized will become (one of) the largest EU databases, 
also storing biometric identifiers of TCNs and being interoperable with the Visa Information 
System (VIS).11 The EES, therefore, constitutes one further step in a line of IT systems that 
are being established on EU level, with a primary purpose of migration management and 
border control, and a secondary objective to allow law enforcement access to retained data 
for the purpose of crime prevention and prosecution. All of these databases and the periods 
for retention of data in these databases must fulfil the above mentioned test by providing a 
legitimate aim that is pursued and proportionate measures as to how the aim is reached.  
The CJEU has, on several occasions, ruled on the legitimacy of general data retention 
regimes that are (also) used for subsequent access by LEAs. These decisions are briefly 
recalled below to illustrate they contribute to the development of general principles for (bulk) 
data retention measures. Most recently, on 26 July 2017, the CJEU issued an Opinion12 on 
the Draft Agreement between the EU and Canada on the transfer and use of Passenger 
Name Records (PNR) data, holding that the agreement may not be concluded in its current 
draft form. This decision does not only significantly change the scope and form of a possible 
future PNR Agreement concluded with Canada and other States as well as existing PNR 
arrangements, it is also highly important for data retention schemes in general as it builds on 
and expands the findings of previous decisions of the CJEU on such schemes. Although 
Opinion 1/15 does not prohibit the systematic transfer and automated analysis of all PNR 
data of passengers travelling to Canada as such, the Court strongly criticized the conditions 
for judicial authorization prior to LE access to retained data. This concern it had already 
pointed out in both the Digital Rights Ireland13 and the Tele2/Watson14 judgments which dealt 
with EU and national rules about communications data retention obligations on private 
operators. 
As will be shown, just like the EES can be seen as yet a further step towards an integrated 
border management system, Opinion 1/15 is a further step in the Court’s consistent line of 
case law concerning mass data retention regimes. The CJEU followed the general principles 
that it had established in previous judgments and which it cites throughout the Opinion. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Report, “Fundamental rights and the interoperability of EU information systems: borders and security”, July 
2017; FRA 2014, “Twelve operational fundamental rights considerations for law enforcement when 
processing Passenger Name Record (PNR) data”; Dennis Broeders et al., “Big Data and Security Policies: 
Towards a Framework for Regulating the Phases of Analytics and Use of Big Data”, Computer Law & 
Security Review 33, no. 3 (June 2017). 
11  Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data 
between Member States on short-stay visas (VIS Regulation) [2008] OJ, L 218/60. 
12  Opinion 1/15 of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 26 July 2017 pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU 
on the Draft agreement between Canada and the European Union (Passenger Name Records) [2017] 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:592. 
13  Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland (CJEU, 8 April 2014) ECLI:EU:C:2014:238. 
14  Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2/Watson (CJEU, 21 December 2016) ECLI:EU:C:2016:970. 
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Thereby, a list of limitations, requirements and tests concerning data retention schemes has 
been established, which allows its application also in the present context of the planned EES.  
II.  Scope and Structure of the Legal Opinion 
Against this background the Greens/EFA in the European Parliament have requested a legal 
analysis of the implications the most recent CJEU Opinion 1/15 has for the planned EES. In 
order to fully assess the extent of the impact the present opinion will present the specificities 
of the EES measured against the conclusions to be drawn from the Opinion 1/15. It is not 
within the scope of this study to extensively analyse the EES Proposal as it stands now, but 
the focus is on the explanation why the EES cannot be regarded as standing separate from 
the requirements set by the CJEU for data retention schemes in other contexts.  
The legal opinion will present the findings based on the following structure: first, the relevant 
legislative framework will be briefly mentioned including the provisions in primary law that 
need to be respected in the creation of secondary EU law (B. I.). This will be followed by an 
overview of the previous case law of the CJEU that is of relevance in the context of 
evaluating the EES (B. II.) and what can be concluded already from the case law prior to 
Opinion 1/15, including the relevance of the ECtHR’s case law on mass surveillance and 
Article 8 ECHR infringements generally. Part C. will give an overview of those parts of the 
EES that are specifically impacted by the holding of the CJEU in that Opinion. The extensive 
analysis of Opinion 1/15 follows (D.) with an overview of all important points made by the 
Court, before putting these in context with the earlier case law and concluding which findings 
are to be tested with the EES proposal.  
The application of these standards to the EES in part E. will show how the EES needs to be 
evaluated in light of the Opinion 1/15; the focus will be on the different retention periods in 
light of the data stored (E. II.) as well as on the question of LE access to the retained data 
based on evidence of its relevance and what procedures are foreseen for judicial or 
independently given authorization prior to such access (E. III.). The final part concludes the 
findings and will underline that the EES does not respect the standards developed by the 
CJEU and therefore should not be passed in the current form.  
 
  
   
Data Retention in the EES and CJEU Opinion 1/15  Prof. Dr. Mark D. Cole 
Legal Opinion - 7 - Teresa Quintel 
B.  The Applicable EU Legal Framework for Data Retention  
I.  Primary and Secondary Law  
In order to evaluate the impact of the recent case law of the CJEU on the Proposal for a 
Regulation on the EES, it will briefly be recalled which acts and provisions in EU law can be 
of relevance.  
1.  Relevant provisions in the Treaties and Charter 
Article 16 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) lays down already in the 
Treaty as primary law a specific right to data protection. This underlines the importance of 
the fundamental right as typically the fundamental rights provisions are now to be found in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which has the same legal value as 
the Treaties since entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The Charter also prominently 
displays the right to privacy and – in addition, which is a noteworthy difference to the 
provision in the Convention – to data protection in Articles 7 and 8 respectively. The 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of the Council of Europe includes a right to 
privacy which is laid down in Article 8. This provision has been interpreted widely by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg. Both the provision and its 
interpretation are to be considered within the context of EU law and specifically the Charter 
as Article 7 copies the contents of Article 8 ECHR.  
2.  Relevant Regulations and Directives 
In the field of data protection and specifically data retention the following secondary law was 
created based on the relevant provisions in primary law: 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ L 281/31. 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Di-rective on privacy and electronic communications) Official Journal 
L 201/37, as amended by Directive 2009/136, OJ L 337/11 (Proposal by Commission for 
Repealing this Regulation is currently under debate, see below). 
Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public 
communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58, OJ L 105/54 (declared void by 
the CJEU). 
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Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of 
personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. OJ L 350/60. 
Regulation (EC) 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
the individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions 
and bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 8/1 (Proposal by Commission for 
Repealing this Regulation is currently under debate, see below). 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 
119/1 (the GDPR will replace Directive 95/46/EC as of 25 May 2018). 
Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation 
and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, OJ L 119/132. 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC, COM(2017) 8 final, Brussels,10 January 2017. 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the 
respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and 
repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 
COM(2017) 10 final, Brussels,10 January 2017. 
II.  Relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
In the context of mass data retention schemes, the CJEU delivered several judgments during 
the past years, the most relevant for this opinion being Digital Rights Ireland, Tele2/Watson 
and Schrems15. In Opinion 1/15 the Court relied on these judgments to determine the 
requirements that must be fulfilled when introducing mass data retention schemes that 
provide for subsequent access for crime investigation purposes. Those requirements include, 
inter alia, the principle of proportionality and strict necessity regarding data retention periods, 
conditions for LE access to retained data, and the existence of objective evidence when 
granting such access for the purpose of the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of serious crime. 
                                                
15  Case C-362/14, Schrems (CJEU, 6 October 2015) ECLI:EU:C:2015:650. 
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1.  Data Retention Schemes and Fundamental Rights 
In Digital Rights Ireland, the Court found that: 
“[…] retention of data also falls under Article 8 of the Charter because it constitutes 
the processing of personal data within the meaning of that article and, therefore, 
necessarily has to satisfy the data protection requirements arising from that 
article”.16 
“[…] data which must be retained pursuant to that directive allow the national 
authorities which are competent for criminal prosecutions to have additional 
opportunities to shed light on serious crime and, in this respect, they are therefore a 
valuable tool for criminal investigations. Consequently, the retention of such data 
may be considered to be appropriate for attaining the objective pursued by that 
directive”.17 
However: 
“[The retention] period is set at between a minimum of 6 months and a maximum of 
24 months, but it is not stated that the determination of the period of retention must 
be based on objective criteria in order to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly 
necessary”.18 
In Tele2/Watson, the CJEU considered that: 
“Having regard, inter alia, to the close relationship between the retention of data and 
access to that data, it was essential that that directive should incorporate a set of 
safeguards and that the Digital Rights judgment should analyse, when examining 
the lawfulness of the data retention regime established by that directive, the rules 
relating to access to that data”.19 
The Court added: 
“In order to satisfy the requirements set out in the preceding paragraph of the 
present judgment, that national legislation must, first, lay down clear and precise 
rules governing the scope and application of such a data retention measure and 
imposing minimum safeguards, so that the persons whose data has been retained 
have sufficient guarantees of the effective protection of their personal data against 
the risk of misuse. That legislation must, in particular, indicate in what circumstances 
and under which conditions a data retention measure may, as a preventive 
measure, be adopted, thereby ensuring that such a measure is limited to what is 
strictly necessary”.20 
                                                
16 CJEU, Case C-­‐293/12 and C-­‐594/12 Digital Rights Ireland para 29. 
17  CJEU, Case C-­‐293/12 and C-­‐594/12 Digital Rights Ireland para 49. 
18  CJEU, Case C-­‐293/12 and C-­‐594/12 Digital Rights Ireland para 64. 
19  CJEU, Case C-­‐203/15 and C-­‐698/15 Tele2/Watson para 57. 
20  CJEU, Case C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2/Watson para 109. 
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2.  Access to Retained Data by Competent Authorities for LE Purposes 
The conditions for LE access to data are somewhat clearer than the limits on the retention of 
data. The Court consistently held that, as a general rule, such LE access must be subject to 
prior review by a court or an independent authority. 
In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU held that: 
“the access of the competent national authorities to the data constitutes a further 
interference with that fundamental right (see, as regards Article 8 of the ECHR, Eur. 
Court H.R., Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, § 48, Series A no 116; Rotaru v. 
Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 46, ECHR 2000-V; and Weber and Saravia v. 
Germany (dec.), no. 54934/00, § 79, ECHR 2006-XI)”.21 
“It must therefore be held that the retention of data for the purpose of allowing the 
competent national authorities to have possible access to those data, as required by 
Directive 2006/24, genuinely satisfies an objective of general interest”.22 
In Schrems, the Court maintained that: 
“The right to respect for private life, guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter and by 
the core values common to the traditions of the Member States, would be rendered 
meaningless if the State authorities were authorised to access electronic 
communications on a casual and generalised basis without any objective 
justification based on considerations of national security or the prevention of crime 
that are specific to the individual concerned and without those practices being 
accompanied by appropriate and verifiable safeguards”.23 
In Tele2/Watson, the Court found that: 
“In order to ensure, in practice, that those conditions are fully respected, it is 
essential that access of the competent national authorities to retained data should, 
as a general rule, except in cases of validly established urgency, be subject to a 
prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body, 
and that the decision of that court or body should be made following a reasoned 
request by those authorities submitted, inter alia, within the framework of 
procedures for the prevention, detection or prosecution of crime”.24 
3.  Objective Evidence to justify LE Access and Strict Necessity 
In order to make LE access to retained data lawful, objective evidence must exist that there 
is a link between the data and the objective to fight serious crime. Thus, only where LE 
access is strictly necessary to achieve that objective, such access may be granted. 
In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU acknowledged that: 
                                                
21  CJEU, Case C-293/12 and C‑594/12 Digital Rights Ireland para 35. 
22  CJEU, Case C‑293/12 and C‑594/12 Digital Rights Ireland para 44. 
23  CJEU, Case C-362/14 Schrems para 34. 
24  CJEU, Case C‑203/15 and C‑698/15 Tele2/Watson para 120. 
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“[The Directive] therefore applies even to persons for whom there is no evidence 
capable of suggesting that their conduct might have a link, even an indirect or 
remote one, with serious crime”.25 
“It must therefore be held that Directive [2006/24] entails a wide-ranging and 
particularly serious interference with those fundamental rights in the legal order of 
the EU, without such an interference being precisely circumscribed by provisions to 
ensure that it is actually limited to what is strictly necessary”.26 
The Court concluded: 
“Having regard to all the foregoing considerations, it must be held that, by adopting 
Directive [2006/24], the EU legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by 
compliance with the principle of proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) 
of the Charter”.27 
“Legislation is not limited to what is strictly necessary where it authorises, on a 
generalised basis, storage of all the personal data of all the persons [whose data 
has been transferred from the European Union to the United States] without any 
differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of the objective 
pursued and without an objective criterion being laid down by which to determine 
the limits of the access of the public authorities to the data, and of its subsequent 
use, for purposes which are specific, strictly restricted and capable of justifying the 
interference which both access to that data and its use entail”.28 
In Tele2/Watson, the Court confirmed that: 
“Due regard to the principle of proportionality also derives from the Court’s settled 
case-law to the effect that the protection of the fundamental right to respect for 
private life at EU level requires that derogations from and limitations on the 
protection of personal data should apply only in so far as is strictly necessary”.29 
Therefore: 
“As regard the setting of limits on such a measure with respect to the public and the 
situations that may potentially be affected, the national legislation must be based 
on objective evidence which makes it possible to identify a public whose data is 
likely to reveal a link, at least an indirect one, with serious criminal offences, and to 
contribute in one way or another to fighting serious crime or to preventing a serious 
risk to public security”.30 
                                                
25  CJEU, Case C‑293/12 and C‑594/12 Digital Rights Ireland para 58. 
26  CJEU, Case C‑293/12 and C‑594/12 Digital Rights Ireland para 65. 
27  CJEU, Case C‑293/12 and C‑594/12 Digital Rights Ireland para 69. 
28  CJEU, Case C-362/14 Schrems para 93. 
29  CJEU, Case C‑203/15 and C‑698/15 Tele2/Watson para 96. 
30  CJEU, Case C-­‐203/15 and C-­‐698/15 Tele2/Watson para 111. 
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4.  The impact of the Convention and ECtHR Case Law on the interpretation by the 
CJEU 
An important further development in the case law of the Court of Justice in the context of the 
interpretation Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter is the increasing reliance on the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).31 This was very explicit in the cases of Tele2 / 
Watson and Digital Rights Ireland32 when it narrowly limited data collection and storing 
activities based on EU law with a reference to the case law of the Strasbourg Court.33 The 
CJEU in Tele2/Watson followed the approach of the Strasbourg Court and required similar 
prerequisites to safeguard data subjects’ rights, as well as objective criteria in order to define 
the circumstances under which LEAs may be granted access to retained data.34 
Interestingly, in the meanwhile the ECtHR – even though not interpreting EU law or its 
transposition in national law – in order to substantiate its interpretation of Article 8 ECHR also 
explicitly35 or implicitly36 referred to the judgements of the CJEU37 when declaring national 
laws on mass surveillance incompatible with the Convention. 
Particularly the principle of proportionality in the framework of data retention and mass 
surveillance plays a crucial role in all of the judgments by both Courts. Moreover, the Courts 
are critical about lacking ex ante authorization procedures and missing judicial control.38 
Therefore, it is crucial to also take into account the approach taken by the ECtHR in that field 
of case law, when assessing the CJEU’s findings regarding (mass) data retention. More 
specifically, when looking at the impact specific CJEU decisions giving further clarity to the 
understanding of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter have for related areas of law, one needs to 
read these in conjunction with the holdings of the ECtHR on Article 8 ECHR.  
                                                
31  Mark D. Cole and Annelies Vandendriessche, “Case Note:From Digital Rights Ireland and Schrems in 
Luxembourg to Zakharov and Szabó/Vissy in Strasbourg: What the ECtHR Made of the Deep Pass by the 
CJEU in the Recent Cases on Mass Surveillance. Roman Zakharov v Russia (App no. 47143/06) and Szabó 
and Vissy v Hungary (App no. 37138/14)”, (2016) 2(1) European Data Protection Law Review (EDPL), p. 
121-129 and previously: Franziska Boehm and Mark D. Cole, ‘EU Data Retention – Finally Abolished? Eight 
Years in the Light of Article 8’, in: CritQ, Critical Quarterly for Legislation and Law, Volume 1, 2014, 58 et 
seq.. 
32  As mentioned above, in Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU referred to Leander v. Sweden; Rotaru v. Romania 
[GC]; and Weber and Saravia v. Germany. On the significance of the ECtHR case law also Mark D. Cole and 
Franziska Boehm, “Data Retention after the Judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union,” June 
30, 2014, p. 27-35. 
33  See for instance paras 119 and 120 of the Tele2/Watson judgment, where the CJEU refers to case Zakharov 
v Russia App no 47143/06 (ECtHR, 4 December 2015) and case Szabó and Vissy v Hungary App no 
37138/14 (ECtHR, 12 January 2016). 
34  CJEU, Case C-­‐203/15 and C-­‐698/15 Tele2/Watson para 119. 
35  Szabó and Vissy v Hungary App no 37138/14 (ECtHR, 12 January 2016) 
36  Roman Zakharov v Russia App no 47143/06 (ECtHR, 4 December 2015). 
37  See for instance Zakharov v Russia, where the ECtHR refer to Digital Rights Ireland at para 147. 
38  Mark D. Cole and Teresa Quintel, ““Is there anybody out there?” – Retention of Communications Data. 
Analysis of the status quo in light of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in: Weaver et al. (ed.), Privacy in an Internet Age, CAP 
2018 (forthcoming). 
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III.  Interim Conclusion on the Impact of the existing CJEU case law  
During recent years, and particularly after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the 
EU Charter becoming a legally binding instrument, the CJEU has on several occasions ruled 
on the compatibility of mass data retention schemes with the fundamental rights to privacy 
and data protection. Several requirements for the establishment of such schemes are 
reoccurring in all of these judgments and may be regarded as general principles that, like a 
‘red thread’, navigate through the Court’s jurisprudence on data retention. These general 
principles include inter alia the setting of limited data retention periods, judicial authorization 
prior to LE access to retained data, objective evidence of crime in order to grant such 
access, and strict necessity as to the objective pursued by the legislative measure. 
On that account, the CJEU rulings in the context of data retention leave no doubt that the 
findings of the CJEU concerning the applicability of the Charter provisions as well as the 
approach of the ECtHR in Strasbourg, where an elaborate case law also exists, need to be 
read into further fields where data retention takes place, and are not limited to relevant 
provisions concerning telecommunications or PNR data. 
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C.  The Proposal for a Regulation on an Entry/Exit System (EES) 
In order to be able to evaluate the impact of the CJEU Opinion 1/15 on the anticipated 
Entry/Exit System, it is first necessary to briefly present the main elements of the EES that 
are relevant in the context of this legal opinion. This presentation will contribute to 
understanding – after having analysed the Opinion in more depth in the next chapter – 
whether or not elements of Opinion 1/15 can be transferred to further areas concerned with 
data protection. 
The following section will therefore give a brief overview of the system’s structure and 
subsequently illustrate both the legal basis and the purpose of the proposed EES Regulation, 
thereby particularly focussing on retention periods and LE access to retained data. 
Thereafter, the analysis will address the main findings of the CJEU in Opinion 1/15 with 
regard to retention periods and LE access as well as the limitations and safeguards that must 
be satisfied when implementing mass (PNR) data retention schemes. 
I.  Background 
The Schengen Borders Code39 has no provisions on the recording of travellers’ cross border 
movements into and out of the Schengen area. As a general rule, TCNs have the right to 
enter the Schengen area for a short stay of up to 90 days within any 180-day period either 
with or without the need for the prior granting of a visa.40 Currently the stamping of the travel 
documents indicating the dates of entry and exit is the sole method available to border 
guards and immigration authorities to calculate the duration of stay of TCNs and to verify if a 
person is overstaying the authorized period of a visa.41  
In a nutshell, the proposed Regulation establishing an EES addresses TCNs entering the 
Schengen area for a short stay. The proposed EES Regulation excludes from its scope on 
the other hand TCNs holding a long-stay visa as well as EU citizens and residents, persons 
enjoying the right of free movement and other TCNs under Article 2(3) of the proposed EES 
Regulation. The EES Regulation was proposed by the Commission in order to improve the 
management of external borders, prevent irregular immigration and facilitate the 
management of migration flows. Recital (16) states that, in the fight against terrorist offences 
and other serious criminal offences, it is vital that law enforcement authorities have the most 
                                                
39  Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code 
on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) [2016] OJ L 77/1 
and Regulation (EU) 2017/458 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external 
borders [2017] OJ L 74/1. 
40  Generally, a short-stay visa issued by one of the Schengen States entitles its holder to travel throughout the 
26 Schengen States for up to 90 days in any 180-day period. Visas for visits exceeding that period remain 
subject to national procedures. European Commission, “Visa Policy”, Migration and Home Affairs - European 
Commission, December 6, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/visa-policy_en. 
41  COM(2016) 194 final, p. 2. 
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up-to-date information. Consequently, the information contained in the EES should be 
available to the competent LEAs of the Member States and Europol42, as according to the 
Commission, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the fight against international 
terrorism in order to maintain international peace and security constitutes an objective of 
general interest.43 
II.  Overview of the draft Regulation  
1.  Structure  
The EES is divided in nine chapters, the first dealing with general provisions, principles, 
scope, purpose and the technical architecture of the system, including the foreseen 
interoperability of the EES with the VIS. In addition, Chapter I defines the competent 
authorities that are authorized to enter, amend, delete and consult data stored in the EES. 
Furthermore, the chapter includes provisions on the automated calculation of the duration of 
authorized stays, information to be given to data subjects on the remaining period of their 
authorized stay, as well as the information mechanism to be set up for the identification of 
TCNs exceeding the period of their authorized stay.  
Chapter II contains provisions stipulating the conditions for the use of data stored in the EES 
by competent authorities, data to be entered into the EES according to different types of visa, 
in case of refusal of entry and in the event of a change of a visa status. Finally, Article 23 
lays down the conditions for both verification and comparison of identity and prior registration 
of TCNs in the system for the performance of border checks. Chapter III specifies the 
requirements for other authorities to examine visa applications and to decide on access of 
TCNs to national facilitation programs. Moreover, Articles 26 and 27 stipulate the conditions 
for immigration authorities to access data of TCNs for verification and identification purposes 
and to determine cases in which data retrieved from the EES may be kept in national files. 
Chapter IV lays down the procedures and conditions for access to the EES by competent 
authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes and Chapter V stipulates the retention 
periods for data storage, as well as the condition for amendments of data. Both chapters are 
highly important when considering the impact of existing case law of the CJEU in data 
retention cases has on the proposed EES. Therefore, these will be further discussed below 
with regard to the requirements set out in CJEU judgments and, in particular, its Opinion 
1/15. 
                                                
42  European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, “Opinion on the legal basis of 
the Proposal for a Regulation establishing an Entry/Exit System”, 14 June 2017, p. 4. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bCOMPARL%2bPE-603.073%2b01%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN.   
43  Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Annexes to the Impact Assessment report on the 
introduction of an Entry Exit System, part 3/3, SWD(2016) 115 final, Brussels April 2016, p. 136. Cf. cases 
cited by the Commission: Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P; Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
v Council and Commission EU:C:2008:461, para 363 and Cases C-539/10 P and C-550/10 P Al-Aqsa v 
Council EU:C:2012:711 para 130. 
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Chapter VI defines both the operational development of the EES and the responsibilities of 
the Member States and Europol when collecting, retaining and transferring data to third 
countries and to those Member States that do not operate the EES. Furthermore, the chapter 
addresses provisions relating to data protection and data security, liability in the event of 
unlawful processing, keeping of logs, self-monitoring and penalties to be imposed for 
wrongfully entered data. Chapter VII provides for data subjects’ rights of information, access, 
rectification, completion, erasure and restriction of processing, as well as documentation, 
remedies and supervision by the supervisory authorities and the EDPS. Article 52 lays down 
the condition for the protection of data accessed and used by LEAs pursuant to chapter IV. 
Once accessed by national LEAs, those data are to be processed in accordance with the 
provisions of Directive 2016/680.  
Finally, Chapters VIII (amendments to other Union instruments) and IX (Final provisions) 
contain standard and more technical provisions. One important aspect to be mentioned with 
regard to the amendments to other Union instruments is the above-mentioned 
interoperability, which requires the amendment of certain provisions under the VIS 
Regulation. The interoperability of databases and the impact on fundamental rights will be 
taken into consideration below with regard to concerns regarding the development of further 
(interoperable) databases in the future.  
2.  Purpose and Legal basis of the EES 
a)  Legal basis 
The Commission proposed Article 77(2)(b) and (d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union as the appropriate legal basis for the establishment of the EES. In addition, 
the revised proposal relies on Article 87(2)(a) TFEU, which falls under Chapter 5 (police 
cooperation) and has thus been considered the appropriate legal basis to allow access to the 
Entry/Exit system by national LEAs. Finally, Article 88(2)(a) TFEU regarding the adoption of 
Regulations by the European Parliament and the Council in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure for the determination of among others Europol’s tasks was initially 
proposed as additional legal basis. 
In April 2017, it was agreed to delete one of the legal bases provided in the Commission 
proposal, namely Article 88(2)(a) TFEU.44 Article 77(2)(b) and (d) TFEU in conjunction with 
Article 87(2)(a) TFEU are presented as the legal basis in the proposal as of June 2017. 
b)  Objectives of the EES 
The EES proposal pursues a twofold objective, namely the management of external borders 
and the access to EES data by law enforcement authorities for the prevention, detection and 
                                                
44  The proposed Regulation does not establish new tasks and does not aim to modify the existing tasks of 
Europol on the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of information as provided for in 
Article 88(2)(a) TFEU and Article 17(3) of the Europol Regulation, which already provides for Europol’s 
access to data from Union information systems, European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs, “Opinion on the legal basis of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES)”, 14 June 2017, p. 2. 
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investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences. The proposed 
Regulation aims to establish an Entry/Exit system that will register information on the entry, 
exit and refusal of entry of TCNs crossing the external borders of the Schengen area. 45  
Based on the first objective of the EES, the system seeks to improve i) border checks for 
TCNs by reducing delays and enhancing the quality of border checks by automatically 
calculating the authorised stay of each traveller; ii) the systematic and reliable identification 
of ‘overstayers’; and iii) the internal security in the EU and the fight against terrorism and 
serious crime by granting law enforcement authorities access to travel history records.46  
The EES will collect data, create and store entry and exit records of TCNs with a view to 
facilitating the border crossings of bona fide travellers, identifying refused TCNs at the border 
and better detecting overstayers. The EES will record refusals of entry of TCNs falling within 
its scope and give access to LEAs to perform queries in the database for criminal 
identification and intelligence for purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of 
terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences. 
aa)  Data registered for the purpose of border control 
The Entry-Exit system will apply to TCNs who are admitted for a short stay in the territory of 
the Member States and who are subject to border checks in accordance with the Schengen 
Borders Code when crossing the external borders of the Schengen area. The Entry/Exit 
system will apply to visa-exempt TCNs as well as those who are admitted for a short stay of 
maximum 90 days in any 180-day period and can enter, leave and re-enter in that time 
period, which is why the EES information allows for a tracking of movements in a more 
detailed manner than for holders of other types of visa. The scope of the EES, thus, includes 
border crossings by all TCNs visiting the Schengen area for a short stay (both visa-required 
and visa-exempt travellers).  
The EES will register entry, exit and refusal of entry of TCNs storing information on their 
identity, their travel documents as well as biometric data (four fingerprints and the facial 
image). Pursuant to Article 14 of the draft EES Regulation, the competent border authorities 
shall create an individual file of each TCN who is subject to a visa requirement when 
crossing the external borders of the Member States. This individual file contains information 
concerning name(s), date of birth, nationality, sex, type and number of travel document(s) 
and the three-letter code of issuing country of the travel document(s). Moreover, the EES will 
retain biometric data such as a facial image and finger prints. Finally, the exact information 
on date and time of entry, border crossing point and the authority that authorized the entry, 
shall be entered. Once the TCNs left the EU, date and time of exit, as well as the border 
crossing point of the last exit shall be registered. Where there is no exit at the end of a TCN’s 
stay, the entry/exit record shall be marked with a flag. Articles 15, 16 and 17 specify the data 
that are to be retained for TCNs who are exempt from the visa obligation, TCNs who have 
been refused entry and information that is to be added when authorization for short stay is 
                                                
45  European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, “Opinion on the legal basis of 
the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Entry/Exit 
System (EES)”, 14 June 2017. 
46  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/30-entry-exit-system/. 
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revoked, annulled or extended. Moreover, Article 18 of the proposed Regulation provides for 
interoperability between the EES and VIS for those TCNs who require a visa to cross the EU 
external border.  
bb)  Law enforcement access 
Chapter IV of the proposed EES Regulation focuses on the procedures and conditions for 
access to the EES by Member States’ designated LEAs for the prevention, detection and 
investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences (Articles 26, 28 and 29) 
and by Europol’s designated authority (Articles 27 and 30).47 Member States' LEAs and 
Europol will be granted access to the EES from the start of operations48 in order to inter alia 
contribute to the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences or of other 
serious criminal offences and by that, attain the secondary objective of the EES.49 
According to the Commission, the EES will contain reliable data on entry and exit dates of 
TCNs falling within the scope of the EES that can be of decisive importance in individual law 
enforcement files50: “As such, for the purposes of criminal investigations, the EES is said to 
provide data to confirm or not the presence of specific TCNs in the Schengen area. The EES 
also uses the identification data to link entries and exits and can act as the database of last 
resort for identifying persons when more focused databases did not yield a result”.51 Thus, 
the EES will be the only system that collects and stores the entry/exit data of all TCNs 
entering the Schengen area for a short stay, whether via a land, sea or air border and 
therefore, will by far be the most complete database storing such data.52 
 
 
                                                
47  European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, “Opinion on the legal basis of 
the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Entry/Exit 
System (EES)”, 14 June 2017, p. 4. 
48  COM(2016) 194 final, p. 6. 
49  SWD(2016) 115 final, p. 136. 
50  COM(2016) 194 final, p. 6. 
51  SWD(2016) 115 final, p. 136. 
52  SWD(2016) 115 final, p. 136. 
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D.  The CJEU Opinion 1/15 on the EU-Canada PNR Agreement 
I.  Background 
In 2005 the European Commission adopted an Adequacy Decision under Article 25(2) of the 
EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC in which it considered the Canadian Border Services 
Agency (CBSA) to provide an adequate level of protection for the transfer of PNR data for 
flights from the EU to Canada.53 In the following year an agreement between the EU and 
Canada concerning the processing of advance passenger information (API) and PNR data 
came into force. Both Decision and Agreement expired three and a half years in September 
2009, but Canada declared that it would continue to apply these protections voluntarily.54  
On 2 December 2010, the Council adopted a decision, authorising the Commission to open 
negotiations with Canada on a new agreement on the transfer and use of PNR data to 
prevent and combat terrorism and other serious transnational crime. This new agreement for 
the transfer and use of PNR data between the EU and Canada was signed on 25 June 2014, 
after the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) had delivered an opinion on the 
proposal. Thereafter, the Council sought approval of the draft agreement by the European 
Parliament, which on 25 November 2014 decided to request an opinion from the CJEU 
pursuant to Article 218(11) on two questions.55 
The first question raised concerned the compatibility of the draft PNR agreement with the EU 
Charter, in particular Articles 7 and 8. The second question concerned the choice of legal 
basis of the PNR Agreement, which the Council had proposed to be concluded on the basis 
of Article 82 (judicial cooperation in criminal matters) and Article 87 (police cooperation) 
TFEU. The question raised by the European Parliament was whether Article 16 TFEU would 
not be the appropriate legal basis. The application was lodged with the Court on 10 April 
2015 and on 26 July, the CJEU delivered its final Opinion on the questions concerning the 
draft agreement. It was the first time that the Court had ruled on the compatibility of a draft 
international agreement with the EU Charter. In general, the CJEU followed the opinion of 
Advocate General (AG) Mengozzi that was issued on 8 September 2016, holding that the 
PNR Agreement in the form signed by the Council cannot be concluded.56 First, the CJEU 
found that the agreement was based on the wrong legal basis and that instead Article 16(2) 
and Article 87(2)(a) TFEU were the correct legal basis. Secondly, the Court held that the 
PNR Agreement, in its current form, was not fully compliant with the EU Charter. 
                                                
53  Decision 2006/253/EC on the adequate protection of personal data contained in the Passenger Name 
Record of air passengers transferred to the Canada Border Services Agency [2006] OJ L 91, p. 49. 
54  Christopher Kuner, “Data Protection, Data Transfers, and International Agreements: the CJEU’s Opinion 
1/15”, VerfBlog, 2017/7/26, http://verfassungsblog.de/data-protection-data-transfers-and-international-
agreements-the-cjeus-opinion-115/, DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20170727-094655 .,  
55  More on the background and history of the Agreement cf. Opinion 1/15 paras 16-24. 
56  Hielke Hijmans, “PNR Agreement EU-Canada Scrutinised: CJEU Gives Very Precise Guidance to 
Negotiators”, in (2017) 3(3) European Data Protection Law Review (EDPL), p. 407. 
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II.  Main Findings of the Court 
As in previously established case law, the CJEU followed an approach of different stages in 
order to assess whether the draft PNR Agreement satisfied the criteria of strict necessity and 
proportionality: The Court first sought to ascertain whether certain articles of the Charter 
were applicable to the Draft Agreement and further questioned whether there was an 
infringement of the fundamental rights enshrined in those articles. Once the Court found an 
infringement of these rights, the Court assessed the seriousness of the fundamental rights 
infringement and analysed very carefully whether the infringement was justified. In that 
regard, the Court analysed the seriousness of the infringement and the justification along the 
principles of necessity and proportionality. 
For the purpose of this opinion, the assessment will primarily concentrate on those matters 
addressed in Opinion 1/15 that might have an impact on disputed provisions of the 
anticipated EES, namely the retention periods foreseen under the EES and the conditions for 
LE access to retained data. Therefore, the following section will first show that the standards 
set by the CJEU in Opinion 1/15 concerning the PNR Agreement should be regarded as 
general principles, which should not only be applied solely in a particular context. Built on this 
first assumption, the analysis will proceed on the assertion that it should not be relevant for 
the applicability of Charter rights whether data undergo processing that is of commercial 
nature, or are being processed by public authorities. Moreover, whether or not data are 
sensitive, or processing inconvenienced the data subject should not change the fact that 
general principles regarding the legitimate aim of processing and appropriate safeguards 
must be followed. Thus, any interference with the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection should require similar safeguards, irrespective of the types of data being 
processed or the purpose of the processing. 
In order to further address the concerns raised by data retention periods, the analysis will 
follow the Court’s line in Opinion 1/15, and assess the strict necessity of data retention by 
distinguishing between the retention of passengers’ PNR data before, during and after their 
stay in Canada. The assessment will then take into account the principles of objective 
evidence and judicial authorization prior to law enforcement access to retained data for the 
purpose of the fight against (serious) crime. Finally, the next section will substantiate the 
arguments with further CJEU judgments that have to be read in conjunction and not isolated 
from the Opinion, namely the Digital Rights Ireland, Schrems and Tele2/Watson judgments. 
1.  International Agreements as integral part of the EU legal system 
Holding that the provisions of international agreements entered into by the European Union 
under Articles 217 and 218 TFEU form an integral part of the EU legal system, the CJEU 
confirmed that such provisions must be entirely compatible with the Treaties and thus, in 
accordance with the principles stemming therefrom.57 The Court thereby acknowledged that 
all EU legislation must be in compliance with the fundamental rights standards enshrined in 
                                                
57  Opinion 1/15 para 67. 
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the Charter and thus, processing under the PNR Draft Agreement should comply with Article 
8 of the Charter.58  
2.  Significance of Types and Purpose of the Data retained 
The CJEU held that the fact that the PNR data under the Draft Agreement were initially 
collected by air carriers for commercial purposes, and not by competent authorities for the 
purpose of the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences would not 
preclude Article 87(2)(a) TFEU (police cooperation) from also constituting an appropriate 
legal basis for the Council decision on the conclusion of the envisaged agreement.59 
The Court thereby followed the AG, who found that the Draft Agreement did not govern the 
collection of PNR data (by the air carriers) and that therefore the initial collection of data did 
not constitute processing of personal data that resulted from the Draft Agreement.60 The AG 
further held that, since the air carriers were obliged to transfer the PNR data to the Canadian 
authorities, the Draft Agreement was not based on the passengers’ consent and the 
possibility to object those transfers was barred.61 This confirms that both the CJEU and the 
AG differentiate between the data initially collected by the air carriers for commercial 
purposes and those data that were to be transferred to the Canadian authorities for the 
prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences.  
Although not directly concerning the type of data as such, this fact may be substantiated by 
the Court’s finding that ‘the processing of PNR data under the envisaged agreement pursues 
a different objective from that for which that data is collected by air carriers’.62 
3.  Applicability of the EU Charter to different forms of processing 
The Court held that the various forms of processing under the Draft Agreement, namely the 
transfer, access, use and retention of personal data, would affect the fundamental right to 
respect for private life guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter, as that data included 
information relating to an identified or identifiable individual.63 
The CJEU further maintained that the communication of personal data to third parties would 
constitute an interference with the fundamental right enshrined in Article 7, irrespective of the 
subsequent use. This would equally apply to both the retention of and access to those data, 
regardless of whether the information in question was sensitive or whether the persons 
concerned had been inconvenienced by the interference.64 Moreover, the “subsequent 
transfer of personal data to other Canadian authorities, Europol, Eurojust, judicial or police 
                                                
58  Opinion 1/15 para 48. 
59  Opinion 1/15 para 101. 
60  AG Opinion, Opinion 1/15 paras 178 and 179. 
61  AG Opinion, Opinion 1/15 para 184. 
62  Opinion 1/15 para 142. 
63  Opinion 1/15 para 122. 
64  Opinion 1/15 para 124. 
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authorities of the Member States or indeed authorities of third countries […] constituted 
interferences with the right guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter”.65 
The processing of the PNR data covered by the Draft Agreement also falls within the scope 
of Article 8 of the Charter, as it constitutes processing of personal data within the meaning of 
that article. Accordingly, all forms of processing under the Draft Agreement must necessarily 
satisfy the data protection requirements laid down in Article 8 of the Charter.66 
4.  Justification for the interference with Article 8 CFR 
Although the Court acknowledged that, for assessing whether the Draft Agreement was 
compatible with the right to the protection of personal data both Article 16(1) TFEU and 
Article 8 of the Charter would be material, the CJEU primarily considered Article 8, with the 
argument that paragraph 2 of that Article would be more extensive and lay down in detail the 
conditions under which personal data may be processed.67 This indicates that the Court sees 
Article 8 as the more specific regulation of the matter and will in future preferably turn to that 
in the interpretation, but irrespective of that it certainly means that the standards developed 
by the CJEU in connection with Article 8 have to be considered whenever an infringement by 
data processing takes place. According to the CJEU, since the processing of the PNR data 
covered by the Draft Agreement would fall within the scope of Article 8 Charter, such 
processing must necessarily satisfy the data protection requirements laid down in that 
article.68 
Consequently, personal data must be processed ‘for specified purposes and on the basis of 
the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law’69 and – 
in accordance with the first sentence of Article 52(1) of the Charter – ‘any limitation on the 
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter must be provided for by law 
and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’. The term ‘provided for by law’ would, 
according to the CJEU, require that the legal basis permitting the interference with any 
Charter right must define the scope of such limitation.70 Furthermore, the principle of 
proportionality under Article 52 (2) would require that limitations of the rights and freedoms 
enshrined in the Charter would be permissible only if they were ‘necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others’.71 In accordance with the CJEU’s jurisprudence, the principle of 
proportionality would further require “that derogations from and limitations on the protection 
of personal data should apply only in so far as is strictly necessary”.72  
The Draft Agreement would therefore have to indicate in what circumstances and under 
which conditions a measure providing for the processing of personal data may be adopted 
                                                
65  Opinion 1/15 para 125. 
66  Opinion 1/15, para 123. 
67  Opinion 1/15 para 120. 
68  Opinion 1/15 para 123. 
69  Opinion 1/15 para 137. 
70  Opinion 1/15 para 139. 
71  Opinion 1/15 para 138. 
72  Opinion 1/15 para 140. 
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and guarantee sufficient safeguards for the protection of personal data from abuse and 
unauthorized access. The Court added that “the need for such safeguards is all the greater 
where personal data is subject to automated processing” or where sensitive data were at 
stake.73 
Drawn from the findings of the Court, it is evident that, in order to be proportionate, limitations 
to the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection are possible only if they are strictly 
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of a general interest that is recognized by the EU. 
In other words, the Court has underlined that this is an especially intense proportionality test 
that has to be passed. 
5.  The retention and use of PNR data before and during passengers’ stay in Canada 
The Court accepted that, for the purpose of the Draft Agreement, the PNR data of all 
passengers travelling to Canada may be transferred by the air carriers to the Canadian 
authorities and further be retained during the passengers’ stay in Canada. The CJEU argued 
that since the provisions under the Draft Agreement would not differentiate between the 
passengers concerned, the retention of the PNR data of all air passengers would be 
permissible.74 In that regard, the AG had rightly pointed to the fact that the processing of data 
must apply to all passengers on an equal basis to prevent unlawful discrimination75 and 
therefore, distinguishing passengers according to, for instance, geographic areas of origin76 
would seem illegitimate. In that regard, the CJEU added that retention and use of PNR data 
for security checks and border control checks may not be restricted to a particular circle of air 
passengers.77 
The Court stipulated, however, that the legislation in question must ‘satisfy objective criteria 
that establish a connection between the personal data to be retained and the objective 
pursued’78 by the Draft Agreement, namely the fight against terrorism and serious 
transnational crime.79  
6.  Retention of data after passengers’ departure from Canada 
Since passengers leaving Canada had been subject to border checks prior to their arrival in 
Canada and their PNR data had also potentially been verified before their departure, the 
Court found that the continued storage of the PNR data of all passengers after their 
departure from Canada would not be limited to what is strictly necessary.80  
                                                
73  Opinion 1/15 para 141. 
74  Opinion 1/15 para 194. 
75  AG Opinion, Opinion 1/15, para 254. 
76  Reference to the geographic criterion in Tele2/Watson para 111. 
77  Opinion 1/15 para 197. Cf. FRA-Gutachten 1/2011 Fluggastdatensätze (Passenger Name Records, PNR-
Daten), Vienna 14 June 2011, p. 7. 
78  Thereby, the Court cited Schrems and Tele2/Watson para 110. 
79  Opinion 1/15, para 191. 
80  Opinion 1/15 para 206. 
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The Court therefore concluded that the Draft Agreement does not ensure that the retention 
and use of PNR data by the Canadian authorities after the air passengers’ departure from 
Canada is limited to what is strictly necessary.81 
The Court, however found that, in particular cases, where there is objective evidence that 
certain air passengers may represent a risk for public security after their departure from 
Canada, it would be permissible to store the PNR data beyond the passengers’ stay in 
Canada.82 In that regard, the CJEU points to the findings in Tele2/Watson, where the Court 
permitted targeted retention as a preventive measure.83  
Provided that the continued storage and use of the PNR data would be based on objective 
criteria showing that they could contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious 
transnational crime, and considering that access to the data by Canadian authorities would 
be subject to prior review carried out either by a court, or by an independent administrative 
body,84 the CJEU held that a five-year retention period would not exceed the limits of what is 
strictly necessary for the purposes of combating terrorism and serious transnational crime.85 
7.  Objective evidence and prior review to LE access to retained data 
With regard to the retention of the PNR data during the passengers’ stay in Canada, the 
Court found a connection between that data and the objective pursued by the Draft 
agreement necessary in order to ensure that the Draft Agreement would not exceed the 
limits of what is strictly necessary.86 
As the data had been analysed before the passengers’ arrival in Canada, the use of that data 
during their stay would presuppose new circumstances in order to be legitimate. Any use of 
the stored data during that period would, therefore, require ‘rules laying down substantive 
and procedural conditions governing that use’ would have to be based on objective criteria in 
order to define the circumstances and conditions under which the Canadian authorities would 
be authorised to use the stored data.87 Only where there would be ‘objective evidence from 
which it may be inferred that the PNR data of one or more air passengers might make an 
effective contribution to combating terrorist offences and serious transnational crime’, the use 
of that data would not exceed the limits of what is strictly necessary. 88 
Moreover, the Court found that it would be essential that the use of retained PNR data, 
during the passengers’ stay in Canada would be subject to a prior review carried out either 
by a court, or by an independent administrative body. An exception to that requirement would 
solely arise in cases of validly established urgency.89 
                                                
81  Opinion 1/15 para 211. 
82  Opinion 1/15 para 207. 
83  Tele2/Watson para 108. 
84  Opinion 1/15 para 208. 
85  Opinion 1/15 para. 209. 
86  Opinion 1/15 para 197. 
87  Opinion 1/15 para 200. 
88  Opinion 1/15 para 201. 
89  Opinion 1/15 para 202. In that context, the Court also referred to para 120 of Tele2/Watson. 
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III.  Opinion 1/15 in context with other case law of the CJEU 
In Opinion 1/15, the CJEU reiterated the standards that it had established in Digital Rights 
Ireland, Schrems and Tele2/Watson, and further extended these principles with regard to 
their applicability to international agreements.  
The Court particularly referred to those three cases regarding the principle of strict 
necessity90 and to the Schrems and Tele2/Watson decisions in the context of data 
retention.91 Citing Tele2/Watson, the Court recalled that in order to retain PNR data there 
must be a link from which it may be inferred that that data “might make an effective 
contribution to combating [serious crime]”92 and, further, access to retained data must “be 
subject to a prior review carried out either by a court, or by an independent administrative 
body”.93 Thus, the application of the main principles laid down by the Court in Digital Rights 
Ireland and Tele2/Watson generally remain the same in respect to the necessity test, which 
is not met where a legislative basis provides for indiscriminative and generalized retention of 
all (traffic) data for subsequent LE access, without a relationship between the data retained 
and a threat to public security.94 
With regard to transfers of data to public authorities outside the EU and effective oversight 
mechanisms, the Court included in its Opinion 1/15 the approach developed in Schrems, 
arguing that transfers of data to a non-EU country are only lawful when that country ensures 
a level of protection “essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union”.95 
Moreover, the Court limited the possibility for Canadian authorities to disclose PNR data to 
other Canadian government authorities and to government authorities of third countries. As 
regards the latter, the Court referred to Schrems, highlighting the risk of circumventing the 
rules on transfers of personal data to third countries if such follow-on transfer were able 
without guaranteeing the essentially same level of protection all along.96 
The Court left no doubt that the transfer and use of PNR data under the Draft Agreement 
constituted an interference with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and thereby confirmed that 
the principles of proportionality and strict necessity indeed have to be complied with in a 
more general manner irrespective of the nature of the instrument or act that potentially 
affects these rights. The Court went on to examine the justification for the interferences on 
the basis of the criteria laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter as interpreted by its earlier 
case law on data protection, in that context also citing Schecke97 beyond again Schrems, 
                                                
90  Opinion 1/15 para 140. 
91  Opinion 1/15 paras 191 and 192. 
92  Opinion 1/15 para 201. 
93  Opinion 1/15 para 202. 
94  Council of the European Union, Information Note Legal Service Permanent Representative Committee (Part 
2), 11931/17, Brussels, 7 September 2017, p. 9. 
95  Opinion 1/15 para 93. 
96  Council of the European Union, Information Note Legal Service Permanent Representative Committee (Part 
2), 11931/17, Brussels, 7 September 2017, p. 12. 
97  Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR (CJEU, 9 November 2010) 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:662. 
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Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2/Watson. In addition, it referred here explicitly to the ECtHR 
judgment S. and Marper.98 
The Court very clearly underlined that Digital Rights Ireland, Schrems and the more recent 
Tele2/Watson judgments form part of a stream of decisions that confirm the fundamental 
right to data protection and should not be regarded as separate elements but jointly 
contributing to a clearer picture of that right.99 From that reasoning, it is clear that the Court 
views also the Opinion 1/15 as horizontal part of its case law on data retention that will have 
important implications for other areas concerned with that matter. 
IV.  Conclusions to be drawn from the findings of the CJEU 
The CJEU accepted both the systematic transfer and the use of personal data, recognizing 
the protection of public security as a general interest of the European Union.100 However, 
where a decision was to be taken based on the outcome of automated processing, any such 
“positive result must be subject to individual re-examination by non-automated means before 
any measure adversely affecting a passenger is taken”.101 This underlines that automated 
processing is especially problematic for individuals and therefore the general interest alone 
does not justify disrespecting the need for an intensified level of scrutiny by human 
involvement.  
The Court discussed in detail the compatibility of the retention periods under the Agreement 
with EU law, distinguishing between the retention and use of the data before the arrival of the 
passengers to Canada, during their stay in the country and after their departure. The CJEU 
held that it would be legitimate to process and retain the data for the purpose of security 
checks and border control, and that the availability of data to LEAs for the prevention of 
terrorism and serious transnational crime might be necessary, also in combination with data 
collected in other databases.102 However, the retention of that information for a particularly 
long period of time after the passengers’ departure was not strictly necessary where the 
outcome of the (original) processing had not identified a person as representing a risk in 
terms of terrorism and international crime.103 Only in the event that there was objective 
evidence that the retained data of certain passengers may contribute to prevent risks to 
public security, a five-year retention period would not exceed the limits of what is strictly 
necessary.104  
The CJEU held that, as a general rule, access to and use of personal data by LEAs would 
only be permitted after prior review by a court or by an independent authority and following a 
                                                
98  Opinion 1/15 para 114, Council of the European Union, Information Note Legal Service Permanent 
Representative Committee (Part 2), 11931/17. Brussels, 7 September 2017 p. 5. 
99  Christopher Kuner “Data Protection, Data Transfers, and International Agreements: the CJEU’s Opinion 
1/15”, VerfBlog, 2017/7/26, http://verfassungsblog.de/data-protection-data-transfers-and-international-
agreements-the-cjeus-opinion-115/, DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20170727-094655. 
100  Opinion 1/15 para 149. 
101  Opinion 1/15 para 173. 
102  Opinion 1/15 para 199. 
103  Hielke Hijmans, “PNR Agreement EU-Canada Scrutinised: CJEU Gives Very Precise Guidance to 
Negotiators”, in (2017) 3(3) European Data Protection Law Review (EDPL), p. 408. 
104  Opinion 1/15 para 207 and 209. 
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reasoned request for access that was based on objective evidence.105 These safeguards are 
obviously necessary from the viewpoint of the Court to ensure that the intensive infringement 
does not happen without a specific fact-checking by either a court or an authority 
independent of the one requesting access.  
With regard to the disclosure of personal data to non-EU government authorities, the Court 
relied on the standard it had established in Schrems, holding that data transfers to third 
countries require a level of data protection in that country that is ‘essentially equivalent’ to 
that under EU law.106 Furthermore, the CJEU held that individuals must have a right to have 
their data rectified107, and that it would be necessary to notify data subjects individually when 
their data had been used108, except where such notification would jeopardise ongoing 
investigations.109 
While the AG had argued that data subjects were entitled to an effective post factum judicial 
review, which could substitute prior authorization by an independent administrative authority 
or judicial control before LE access to data110, the CJEU went beyond this. It insisted on the 
existence of such a safeguard, meaning that either prior control by an independent 
administrative authority or by a court is necessary and it is not sufficient to justify the 
infringement by a review after it has taken place. The Court thereby confirmed that 
compliance with all safeguards would be essential to ensure fundamental rights compliance. 
Thus, even if some of the implemented safeguards are very strong, that does not exclude the 
obligation to also implement the remaining safeguards. 
Especially important in the evaluation of the Court’s Opinion 1/15 is the fact that it once again 
underlined that the proportionality test in connection with limitations to Article 7 and Article 8 
Charter is to be understood as a very strict one because “simple” necessity and meeting 
objectives of general interest is not enough. The scrutiny requires that the objectives are 
genuinely met and the necessity is a strict one. Although this may not go as far as 
constituting a proportionality test that is different from the one applied to other fundamental 
rights in the Charter, it does indicate that the balancing of interests in data retention cases 
affecting Articles 7 and 8 Charter in principle tips in favour of the rights protection and that a 
justification for infringements therefore needs weighty reasons applied carefully.  
 
                                                
105  Opinion 1/15 para 201, 202, 207 and 209. 
106  Opinion 1/15 paras 134 and 214. 
107  Opinion 1/15 para 220. 
108  Opinion 1/15 para 223. 
109  Opinion 1/15 para 224. Cf. Christopher Kuner, “Data Protection, Data Transfers, and International 
Agreements: the CJEU’s Opinion 1/15”, VerfBlog, 2017/7/26, http://verfassungsblog.de/data-protection-data-
transfers-and-international-agreements-the-cjeus-opinion-115/, DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.17176/20170727-
094655. The transfers of data to third countries, access, rectification and notification rights under the EES 
will be subject to the provisions of Regulation 2016/679 and Directive 2016/680 and therefore, not further 
discussed in this legal opinion. 
110  AG opinion, Opinion 1/15 para 272. 
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E.  Applying the standards of Opinion 1/15 to the EES 
I.  General observations 
Opinion 1/15 reinforces that the requirements established by the CJEU are applicable to 
further fields where data retention plays a prominent role, namely the domain of border 
control and migration management. The Court’s approach should be seen as a reminder that 
if the rights enshrined in the Charter are applicable even to international agreements, these 
rights should all the more be taken into account when adopting secondary EU legislation 
which is directed ‘internally’ to the EU. The PNR Opinion must be seen in the context of a 
series of judgments that require strict proportionality and compliance with the fundamental 
rights under the Charter when adopting EU legislative measures in areas affecting the right 
to privacy and data protection. This confirms that whenever the Court applies the 
proportionality test, it must be seen as an overarching concept and cannot be applied in 
different ways according to specific sectors when the same fundamental right is concerned. 
Thus, for each measure adopted that infringes data protection rights, the legitimate aim for 
such measures has to comply with high standards. 
The CJEU’s jurisprudence on data retention leaves little room in interpreting what is to be 
regarded as general principles applied to such measures and it is crucial to see the PNR 
Opinion in the broader context of already prior existing case law in order to substantiate the 
assumption that certain criteria of the Opinion are also be applied for other data retention 
schemes such as the Entry/Exit System. Following the line of the CJEU’s case law on data 
retention, four reoccurring criteria may be established emanating from Digital Rights Ireland, 
Tele2/Watson and now Opinion 1/15. Although these criteria might not have been applied in 
the exactly equivalent manner in those three cases a generally consistent application should 
be achieved in order to ensure compatibility with Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter. These 
criteria can in principle also be applied to bulk data retention schemes in other fields: 
– Retention schemes must be justified and scrutinized based on the principles of 
proportionality and necessity, especially the categories of data and the retention periods 
adopted must be limited to what is strictly necessary. 
– Judicial authorization or prior review by an independent authority is a mandatory 
requirement for lawful LE access to retained data. 
– There must be provisions on the obligation to notify data subjects in the event of use of 
data concerning them (e.g. in the event of access, disclosure or further transfer). 
– The data that may justifiably be retained must be stored within the territory of the EU. 
The following section will focus on the first criteria and assess whether the retention periods 
provided for under the EES may be regarded as being justified and strictly necessary. 
Further, conditions for access by LEAs to the EES will be scrutinized along the second 
criteria. The third criteria will not be further analysed here, as rights of data subjects to be 
notified are subject to the provisions under Regulation 2016/679 and Directive 2016/680. The 
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fourth criterion will also not be addressed, but it needs to be pointed out that concerns 
regarding transfers of data to third countries may arise concerning the conditions provided for 
under Chapters V of both Regulation 2016/679 and Directive 2016/680. 
II.  Proportionality test and strict necessity in view of the retention 
periods under the EES 
1.  Proportionality in view of objective 
As the Draft PNR Agreement and the anticipated Entry/Exit System pursue different 
objectives, it is essential to apply the proportionality test in accordance with the legitimate 
aim that may justify the interference with Articles 7 and 8 Charter in the particular context of 
the respective objectives. As opposed to the PNR Draft Agreement, which seeks to ensure 
public security and to contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious international crime, 
the primary purpose of the EES is the improvement of border checks at the EU’s external 
borders and the identification of TCNs who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry or stay in 
the Schengen area.  
The objective of the PNR Agreement constitutes an objective of general interest of the EU 
that is capable of justifying even serious interferences with the fundamental rights enshrined 
in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.111 In addition, “the protection of public security contributes 
to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.112 The CJEU, however, emphasises 
that – given the seriousness of the interference – only the objective of fighting terrorism and 
serious crime is capable of justifying the mass transfer113, the use by competent authorities114 
and the continued storage of PNR data after passengers’ departure from Canada.115 Thus, 
the Court set a particularly high threshold as regards the legitimate aim to retain data and 
highlights that the interference limiting the rights to privacy and data protection must be 
based on objective evidence that it can actually contribute to the fight against terrorism and 
serious transnational crime.116 In addition, the measure must be strictly necessary.117 
                                                
111  Opinion 1/15 para 148 et seq.; also already in Tele2/Watson para 102. 
112  The Court referred in this context to Article 6 of the Charter “In this connection, Article 6 of the Charter states 
that everyone has the right not only to liberty but also to security of the person”. See Opinion 1/15, para 149; 
CJEU, Case C‑293/12 and C‑594/12 Digital Rights Ireland paras 42 and 44; CJEU (15 February 2016), N., 
C-601/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:84, para 53. 
113  Opinion 1/15 para 149; Tele2/Watson para 102. 
114  Opinion 1/15 para 200. 
115  Opinion 1/15 para 207, Tele2/Watson para 108. 
116  Opinion 1/15 para 207. 
117  Opinion 1/15 para 141. 
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2.  The purposes of the EES 
a)  Management of border crossing and migration  
The justification for the three-years retention period under the EES for TCNs who respected 
the duration of authorized stay is based on border management purposes, decreased border 
crossing time and the facilitation of expedited border crossings.118 Moreover, the retention is 
necessary to allow border guards to perform the necessary risk analysis, to analyse the 
travel history of the applicant and to check whether TCNs have previously exceeded the 
maximum duration of their authorized stay. Therefore, the system should cover a retention 
period which is “sufficient for the purpose of visa issuance”. 119 
As mentioned, concerning the retention of PNR data, the Court underlined that the retention 
of PNR data must be “limited to what is strictly necessary”. It is doubtful whether the general 
improvement of management of the EU’s external borders can be regarded as an objective 
that is to be regarded as compelling in the same way as the fight against terrorism and 
serious crime. Therefore, it is to be questioned whether the CJEU would accept this purpose 
as a basis for extensive data retention. Certainly, the length of retention which is little less 
than what the CJEU accepted for the objective of combatting terrorism and comparable 
crime, is likely to fail the test of strict necessity. Therefore, the three-years retention period of 
data from TCNs for the establishment of an integrated management system for the EU’s 
external borders, to manage migration flows and to prevent irregular migration will be difficult 
to uphold, as such purposes may be achieved with less intrusive measures.  
b)  Prevention of terrorism and serious crime 
The ancillary objective pursuant to Article 5(2) of the proposed EES Regulation is granting 
LEAs access to the system for the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist 
offences or of other serious criminal offences. Moreover, the EES data shall enable LEAs to 
generate information for investigations relating to terrorism or other serious criminal offences. 
The retention of data from TCNs registered in the EES may be proportionate with regard to 
the second objective of the EES insofar as the retained data relates to the prevention, 
detection and investigation of sufficiently serious crime. It is essential to pass the test 
developed by the CJEU that the data retained are not held on storage for long periods of 
time for improving the combatting or prosecution of any type of crime but that it is limited to a 
small number of types of crimes that have a similar seriousness as terrorism. Long periods of 
retention will not satisfy this requirement by the CJEU except if there are provisions 
guaranteeing a use merely in the context of crimes that are “sufficiently serious”. 
3.  Differentiation of retention periods during and after stay in the EU 
In Opinion 1/15, the CJEU held that in order to retain data after passengers’ departure from 
Canada, “the legislation in question must, inter alia, continue to satisfy objective criteria that 
establish a connection between the personal data to be retained and the objective 
                                                
118  Consolidated version of the Proposal for a Regulation establishing an Entry/Exit System, Recital (25). 
119  Consolidated version of the Proposal for a Regulation establishing an Entry/Exit System, Recital (26). 
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pursued”.120 As regards air passengers in respect of whom no risk has been identified there 
is no connection after they have left Canada between their PNR data and the objective 
pursued by the envisaged agreement which would justify that data being further retained.121  
Applying the reasoning of the CJEU to the retention of personal data for the periods foreseen 
under the EES of three and five years respectively, the retention of data from TCNs who do 
not represent a risk to public security seems disproportionate and not limited to what is 
strictly necessary. For the achievement of the primary purpose of the EES, border 
management and the facilitation of border crossings, a retention period of three years is not 
required, and thus, does not represent the least intrusive measure to achieve the objective 
pursued. However, the retention of data from over-stayers or persons with an entry ban may 
be justified for as long as the persons remain absconded or unidentified, or the respective 
period of the entry ban is still valid. But this necessitates a differentiation to be made 
between the group of individuals covered by the EES in total and those for which additional 
length of retention may be justified due to the circumstances of their stay. 
The retention of TCNs after a person has left the EU in light of the argument of the CJEU in 
Opinion 1/15 is only proportionate to achieve the second aim of the EES. Therefore it should 
only be retained in cases where that data may contribute to the fight against terrorism and 
other serious crime. But even in such circumstances it might be more adequate and 
therefore only then proportionate to store those data in databases established purely for LE 
purposes and not in a general border management database. This finding is supported by 
the Court’s argument in Opinion 1/15 and as suggested by the ECtHR in S. and Marper v 
United Kingdom.122 
III.  Objective evidence and judicial control prior to LE access  
The EES should not be regarded as an isolated system, but must be evaluated together with 
already existing databases such as the VIS or the Eurodac database. These systems 
predate the CJEU’s case law on data retention and, at least to some extent, do not fulfil the 
requirements established in Digital Rights Ireland, Tele2/Watson and Opinion 1/15. This is 
particularly true with regard to the role of courts for the authorization of LE access to retained 
data. 
Review prior to LE access to data stored in the EES follows similar procedures as the ones 
under existing databases such as Eurodac or the VIS, and instead of judicial control, it is a 
verifying authority that validates the conditions for access. Access to the EES by LEAs under 
Article 29 (1) and (2) is granted, where the consultation of the EES data may substantially 
contribute to the prevention, detection or investigation of criminal offences, and where the 
search in other databases did not lead to a match. A prior search in the national databases 
may be refrained from, where reasonable grounds exist that such a search would not result 
                                                
120  Opinion 1/15 para 191. 
121  Opinion 1/15 para 205.  
122  Argumentation in Opinion 1/15 para. 172 where the Court characterizes the type of database the Canadian 
authorities should be using; cf. also S and Marper v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 1581; Application nos. 
30562/04 and 30566/04. 
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in a match. The ‘reasonability’ of the requests is verified by a designated law enforcement 
authority (the verifying authority).123  
In exceptional cases of urgency, access to the EES may be granted immediately and 
compliance with the conditions under Article 29 only needs to be scrutinized on an ex post 
basis, including whether an exceptional case of urgency actually existed.124 LE access to the 
EES as a criminal intelligence tool shall be allowed when the conditions are met and where 
there is a duly justified need to consult the entry/exit records of a person. Consultation of the 
EES, in case of a hit, shall give access to any other data taken from the individual file, 
thereby providing an extensive profile of the data subject concerned.  
Review by a court or an independent authority as required by the CJEU in Digital Rights 
Ireland, Tele2 / Watson and in Opinion 1/15 is not an obligation foreseen under the current 
proposal for the EES. Compared to the PNR data that were to be retained for a maximum 
period of five years and only under the condition that LE access was subject to prior review 
by a court or an independent authority as well as depending on that the retained data are 
able to make an effective contribution to combatting serious crime, the retention periods 
under the EES are relatively long and include data that are originally processed for non-LE 
purposes. While access to EES data by LEAs might be a useful tool for the investigation and 
prevention of serious crime, the system of checks and balances established under the 
proposal lacks some of the conditions set out by the CJEU in previous cases. 
                                                
123  COM(2016) 194 final, p. 11. 
124  Where ex post verification determines that access was not justified, the data accessed shall be deleted by 
the authorities that were granted access. 
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F.  Conclusion 
The above analysis has shown that Opinion 1/15 of the CJEU impacts other data retention 
schemes, including the one proposed for the EES, significantly and therefore cannot be 
ignored – neither in on-going legislative procedures nor in view of potential amendments to 
be made to existing instruments. The transferability of the general principles developed in 
previous case law and most recently in Opinion 1/15 leads to the conclusion that at least 
some key elements of the EES are problematic in light of those findings as will be 
summarized below. 
I.  Setting General Standards for Data Retention Schemes 
The requirement for a consistent application of the general guidelines that were established 
by the Court in earlier case law concerning mass data retention schemes has now been 
confirmed in Opinion 1/15. The approach adopted by the CJEU demonstrates that these 
general guidelines must be seen as a line of standard setting that is prevalent in all of the 
above-mentioned judgments and that must be adopted not solely for particular fields such as 
communications related data or instruments such as Directives, but applied consistently to all 
(general) data retention regimes, irrespective of the type of data that are being processed or 
the purpose justifying the retention. 
On many occasions in Opinion 1/15 the Court cites the Digital Rights Ireland judgment, the 
Schrems case as well as the Tele2/Watson decision, which are interlinked. This confirms that 
the approach of the Court taken in Opinion 1/15 follows the reasoning assumed in earlier 
case law, which must be applied in a consistent manner as it constitutes guidance on the 
general approach of the CJEU concerning the protection of privacy and personal data. In 
Opinion 1/15 the Court applied the same methods and principles that were elaborated in 
earlier case law (concerning telecommunications data), by transferring them to a different 
field, namely the retention of PNR data. 
The Court confirmed that international agreements as the one at issue in Opinion 1/15 “form 
an integral part of the EU legal system” that must be “entirely compatible with the Treaties 
and with the constitutional principles stemming therefrom”.125 Such interpretation indicates 
that the reasoning of the CJEU in Opinion 1/15 has a very wide reach and will have an 
impact on any future legislation concerning (mass) data retention, because if international 
agreements have to reach the standards set by the CJEU’s interpretation of the Charter, this 
applies without doubt to the “regular” legislative acts of the EU. Thus, the approach taken by 
the Court concerning the Draft PNR Agreement cannot be regarded as an isolated field of 
application, but must be evaluated as an overarching set of principles that can be applied to 
any general data retention scheme and therefore necessarily also impacts the proposed 
EES. 
                                                
125  Opinion 1/15 para 67. 
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Furthermore, in evaluating measures that impact Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter it is 
important to take into account the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and its interpretation of Article 
8 ECHR, as both the ECtHR and the CJEU irreversibly linked the two legal orders of the 
ECHR and the EU Charter in this specific area. This approach opens the possibility to 
interpret the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection under the Charter in a parallel 
way and permits to link these to comparable findings of the ECtHR. Both Courts established 
general principles for data retention measures that need to be taken into account when 
evaluating similar retention measures. These principles contain far-reaching minimum 
standards and guarantees that have to be linked to any data retention scheme, as is recalled 
below.126 
II.  Applicability of the Charter independent of Types of Data and 
Means for their collection 
When determining the scope of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, the CJEU does not 
differentiate between data that are to be considered as being more relevant in terms of 
fundamental rights protection and other data that may be less protected. Whenever data 
reveal private information, these data must be considered as touching upon Article 7 Charter 
and the processing of such data to be falling within the scope of Article 8 Charter. Therefore, 
different types of data collected for different purposes and possibly by different bodies do not 
per se have an impact on the fundamental rights assessment. This is independent of these 
aspects, it only is based on whether an infringement is justifiable. The impact on the 
balancing test may be different depending on the severity of the infringement, which in turn 
can be different depending on the data collected and retained, but it cannot be argued from 
the outset that certain data are less problematic and therefore the standards developed for 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter can be disrespected. The same goes for the procedure in 
collecting the data: from the viewpoint of the Court it cannot make a difference if data are 
collected initially by private parties for a specific purpose and then made available to 
authorities or whether these data are directly collected by public authorities, because the 
infringement takes place by the mere fact of collection and processing.  
Applying these standards, already in Digital Rights Ireland the Court found the Data 
Retention Directive to be void because it did not comply with the Charter obligations. In the 
Tele2/Watson decision the CJEU confirmed this reasoning, holding that “[Article 15 of the e-
Privacy Directive shall be in accordance with] the general principles of [European Union] law, 
[…], which include the general principles and fundamental rights now guaranteed by the 
Charter”.127 The logic assumed in both cases has now been adopted in Opinion 1/15, which 
demonstrates that the reasoning of the Court applies to general data retention regimes in 
other fields, and a similar line of reasoning concerning the applicability of the Charter and the 
requirements thereof must be followed. The Court very clearly underlined that it is not 
                                                
126  Mark D. Cole and Teresa Quintel, ““Is there anybody out there?” – Retention of Communications Data. 
Analysis of the status quo in light of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in: Weaver et al. (ed.), Privacy in an Internet Age, CAP 
2018 (forthcoming). 
127  Tele2/Watson para 91. 
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sufficient to comply with some of these requirements, but that all principles and safeguards 
have to be satisfied in order to ensure that data retention schemes are compatible with 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.  
Taking the assessment of the data retention schemes by the Court in all three decisions it is 
evident that such schemes by their nature are to be regarded as very critical in view of 
fundamental rights admissibility and, therefore, require a high level of justification. In order to 
meet the standards of proportionality and strict necessity, data retention schemes have to 
fulfil an objective of general interest and need to be balanced carefully, in order to ensure 
that limitations of privacy and data protection rights are based on the least intrusive 
measures. In that context it is noteworthy that the draft PNR Agreement was based on the 
use of data for concerns of public security and fighting crimes whilst the EES primarily shall 
be introduced only as a management element for border control while it only has as a 
secondary objective to fight serious crime. Whereas the CJEU has accepted this latter 
objective as genuinely meeting the general interest objective-test, this is not the case for a 
different objective such as the facilitation of managing border crossings. Even if it is not 
excluded that this is also an important objective of the EU, the necessity test about retaining 
certain amounts of data for certain periods of time needs to be applied in view of this likely 
lesser interest. 
III.  Proportionality in light of Objective and Strict Necessity of 
Retention Periods 
The CJEU upheld in Opinion 1/15 the high threshold as regards the legitimate aim to retain 
data and clarified that interferences limiting the rights to privacy and data protection must 
pursue an objective of general interest and should only be applied in so far as is strictly 
necessary. The Court accepted the continued storage and use of the PNR data only where 
retention would be based on objective criteria showing that the data could contribute to the 
fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime. Only then, a five-year retention period 
would not exceed the limits of what is strictly necessary and would meet the requirements 
stemming from the principle of proportionality. 
The data retention periods as proposed under the EES Regulation for the purpose of 
improving the management of the Union’s external borders cannot be justified in light of that 
holding. As mentioned above, the objective of border management cannot be regarded as 
objective of general interest that is as compelling as the fight against terrorism and serious 
transnational crime. Compared to the data that were to be retained under the Draft PNR 
Agreement for a maximum period of five years and under the condition that there was 
evidence that the retained data could make an effective contribution to combatting serious 
crime, the retention periods under the EES seem excessive. Moreover, other than the Draft 
Agreement, the EES does not provide for the depersonalization of data after a certain time 
has elapsed, but data subjects remain identifiable during the entire period of retention. As 
regards the objective to contribute to the identification of over-stayers, the retention periods 
under the EES proposal may be justified for as long as a person remains unidentified, but 
this again is not a fixed period of time.  
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With regard to the secondary objective of the EES, namely the protection of public security, 
longer retention periods may be justified insofar as retention is based on objective evidence 
that the retained data are necessary to contribute to the prevention, detection and 
investigation of terrorist offences and other serious offences. This must then be limited to 
only concern a selected group of persons filtered from the general scope of application. 
There is a need to find the least intrusive measures that can achieve the objective of crime 
prevention in the most efficient way whilst ensuring that these measures are compatible with 
elementary fundamental rights standards. The usefulness of having data available is no 
relevant criterion. Strict necessity concerning the primary objective of border management 
indeed means that it cannot justify long retention periods, whereas such longer periods for 
the secondary objective may be justifiable but the instrument foreseen is not targeted at 
reaching this goal which is why already the appropriateness of the solution can be 
questioned. 
Although in the preparation of the proposed Regulation compared to an earlier draft a 
reduction of retention periods for some instances has been foreseen, it is not the actual 
length that decides necessity (i.e. whether it is five or three years), but whether it can be 
justified for reaching the objective. Again, any longer retention period may always potentially 
contribute better to reaching a specific goal – for example, a “permanent” registration for 
frequent travellers entering the EU regularly over the years, facilitates the border crossing 
more than if it is only for 6 months or 3 years. This, however, is irrelevant when assessing 
the fundamental rights violation, as the length has to be objectively justified and although 
shorter is less problematic than longer in view of the standards developed for Articles 7 and 8 
of the Charter, shorter is not automatically proportionate. It is indeed not an easy task to 
identify what is an appropriate retention period as the Court rightly has not set a specific 
time-length that is acceptable, but it is one element of the justification that has to be fulfilled 
and the length has to be strictly necessary. Therefore, an objective argument concerning the 
primary goal of the introduction of a retention scheme is necessary for justifying a specific 
length. This is not at all evident for the retention periods foreseen in the proposal for an EES.  
IV.  Judicial or Independent Authorization prior to LE Access to 
Retained Data  
Although evidence or reasonable grounds for serious crime is a mandatory condition to grant 
LEAs and Europol access to data stored in the EES databases as proposed currently, review 
by a court or an independent authority as required by the CJEU is not obligatory. The fact 
that the central access point, through which the requests for access are made and which 
verifies whether the conditions for access are satisfied, may be part of the same organization 
as the designated authority requesting access does not meet the requirements set by the 
CJEU. Therefore, the “objective evidence”-standard that needs to be fulfilled before LE 
access to retained data may be granted, does not seem to accomplish the expectation of the 
Court, which emphasises safeguards provided by independent bodies, ideally in form of a 
court review. 
In a case of urgency, the central access point shall process the request immediately and 
shall only verify ex post whether access was necessary, proportionate and based on 
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objective evidence. Again, instead of a court or an independent authority, the ex-post-review 
will be carried out by the central access point, which will lead to the same concerns as 
regarding the procedures of granting access. Therefore, the proposed EES Regulation does 
not fulfil the requirements of the Court with regard to prior judicial review and lacks truly 
independent ex post review where access requests were granted in a case of urgency. 
V.  Additional Elements of Risk in EES Data Processing 
In Digital Rights Ireland and Opinion 1/15, the CJEU pointed out that the need for safeguards 
is all the greater where personal data are subject to automated processing, where there is a 
risk of unlawful access to data and where sensitive data are at stake. As the processing 
foreseen under the EES is, at least partly, based on automated processing, this increases 
potential difficulties for a justification of infringements to Article 7 and 8 of the Charter 
compared to – already existing – more manual forms of processing comparable data. In 
addition, the data in the EES are very privacy intrusive as they include not only numerous 
elements of information about the private individual but even biometric data. This could raise 
concerns with regard to interoperable databases that will be able to automatically 
communicate information among each other and therefore enable the establishment of a 
more complete profile of individuals. Therefore, it is crucial that the conditions for LE access 
in the different databases are consolidated along a standard model that satisfies the CJEU’s 
requirements of access authorization and aligns the retention periods along the principle of 
strict necessity. 
 
 
In sum, the analysis above shows clearly that the conclusions to be drawn from Opinion 1/15 
in combination with the previous case law of the CJEU are that the principles developed 
therein also impact the admissibility and design of an EES and connected data collection and 
retention. Irrespective of the politically questionable signal if EU legislative bodies would 
agree on an instrument that does not fully meet the requirements for an international 
agreement as set by the Court in view of the protection of EU citizens, because it concerns 
Third Country Nationals, the proposal for the Regulation establishing the EES should in its 
current form be reconsidered, in order to avoid potential difficulties in a later review of the 
instrument by the CJEU. This review would certainly build on the established case law about 
data retention schemes and therefore likely result in the finding of a violation of fundamental 
rights standards due to above presented reasons. 
 
 
 
